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[Crim. No. 4797. In Bank. Nov. 10, 1947.] 
In re WILLIAM JEROME PHYLE, on Habeas Corpus. 
(1] Criminal Law-Judgment-Suspension of Execution of Death 
Penalty-Insanity. - In view of Pen. Code, §§ 3700-3704, re-
lating to proceedings when a person under judgment of death 
is believed to be insane, a person who has been adjudged insane 
and committed to a state hospital after conviction, sentence 
and delivery to a warden of a state prison for execution, and 
who, following certification by the superintendent of such 
hospital that he is sane, has been returned to the custody of 
the warden for execution, has no right to a judicial determina-
tion of his restoration to sanity. 
[S] Id.-Judgment-Suspension of Execution of Death Penalty-
Insanit7.-Under Pen. Code, § 3704, the superintendent of the 
state hospital to which one has been committed following a 
death sentence is not authorized to initiate judicial proceedings 
to determine the question of his restoration to sanity. 
[3] Statutes-Oonstruction-With Reference to Other Laws: Pre-
sumptions.-Pen. Code, § 1372, relating to restoration to san-
ity of a person adjudged insane before conviction, and § 3704, 
relating to restoration to sanity of a person adjudged insane 
after conviction and sentence, are Mt ptJri fllGfeN, and the 
interpretation of a sentence in one controls the interpretation 
of virtually the same sentence in the other. It must be as-
sumed that, when the Legislature adopted § 3704, it was aware 
of the construction that had been given a substantially similar 
provision of the Criminal Practice Act, § 591. 
[4] Crf.mjnaI Law-Judgment-Suspension of Execution of Death 
Penalty-Inaanity.-Pen. Code, § 3704, relating to proceedings 
[1] See 8 OaLJur. 845. 
McX. Dig. References: [1, 2, 4-10] Criminal Law, 11043; [3] 
Sta~ 1Il86, 1»0(4). 
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on restoration to sanity of a person adjudged insane after 
death sentence, is not modified by Welf. & lnst. Code, § 6760, 
prescribing proceedings on recovery of a person who is insane 
when brought to trial. 
[5] Id.-Judgment-Suspension of Execution of Death PenaJty-
Inaanity.-Regardless of what the common law powers of a 
court may be, when the procedure for the determination of 
the question of the sanity of a person who has been sentenced 
to death is covered by statute, a court has no inherent power 
to determine that question; such a person has no right to • 
judicial determination of the question unless the statutes so 
provide. 
[8] Id.-Judgment-Slispension of Execution of Death Penalty-
Insanitr.-The statutory procedure for determining the ques-
tion of restoration to sanity of one who was adjudged insane 
following his conviction and the imposition of a death sen-~ .. , tence (Pen. Code, § 3704), is constitutional as against the 
l' ' objection that defendant's right to an adjudication of such 
~, '" question is protected by the due process clauses of the state 
~; and federal Constitutions. 
l;;' (7) Id.-Judgment-Suspension of Execution of Death PenaJty-
i,~, Insanitr.-The mere fact that a court of law has adjudicated 
,~. that defendant was insane at the time of trial does not give 
~i~. him a vested right to the status of an insane person thereafter, 
~, and where he has been adjudged insane following his con-
t. ' viction and sentence and his execution was suspended only 
until recovery of his reason, a court of law need not deter-
mine that he has been restored to sanity. 
'. [8] Id.-Jucigment-Suspensiou of Execution of Death Penaltr-
. Insanity.-The separation of powers provision of Const., art. 
3, § 1, is not violated by leaving to administrative officers 
;.f,~ the final determination of the sanity of a person who was 
'\f(' adjudged insane following his conviction and sentence, and 
~ .. i., whose execution was suspended pending recovery of his re&-
SOD. 
;'[8] Id.-Jvdpumi--Suspension of Execution of Death Penalty-
~." Insanity.-Asauming that a warden's power with regard to 
questioning the sanity of a prisoner who has been sentenced 
to death (see Pen. Code, § 3701), is judicial, conferring such 
power on him is no violation of Const., art. III, § 1, mce 
art. X, § 7, specifically provides that such officers may have 
, " such powers in respect to "reformatory or penal matters, .. 
. ~ the Legislature may prescribe." 
. 
';', . [5] Insanity supervenin& after ocm"riction and sentence of death, 
:iote, 49 A.L.B. 804.. 
',,:. 
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[10] Id.-J'udgmen~uspe::.sion of Execution of Death Penalty 
-Insa.nity.--Assuming that the power of the superintendent 
of a state hospital with regard to· determining whether a pris-
oner under sentence of death has recovered his reason since 
eommitment to the hospital, is a judicial power, there is no 
unlawful delegation of this power in view of the specific 
authorization in Const., art. X, § 7. 
PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from 
custody. Writ discharged. 
AI Matthews, Morris Lavine and Wallaee S. Myers for 
Petitioner. 
Fred N. Howser, Attorney General, and Clarence A. Linn, 
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-William Jerome Phyle was found guilty 
of first degree murder and sentenced to be executed. The 
judgment was aBirmed by this court (PeopZe v. PkllZe, 28 Cal. 
2d 671 [171 P.2d 428]), and the date of execution was set 
for December 26, 1946. While defendant was awaiting exe-
cution at the state prison at San Quentin, the warden of that 
prison initiated proceedings pursuant to section 3701 of the 
Penal Code to determine the question of defendant's sanity. 
After a jury trial defendant was adjudged insane and com-
mitted to the Mendocino State Hospital. On January 18, 
1947, the superintendent of that hospital certified to the 
Governor that defendant had recovered his reason. The Gov-
ernor then issued a warrant to the warden of the state prison 
at San Quentin appointing May 2,1947, the day of execution. 
One of defendant's attorneys ftled a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus in this court, contending that the superinten-
dent of the Mendocino State Hospital had no authority under 
the law of this state to release the defendant to the warden 
of the state prison at San Quentin without an adjudication 
of a competent court that defendant had .r8COvered his reason. 
This court issued the writ for the purpose of giving consid-
eration to this contention. 
Section 1367 of the Penal Code provides that "A person 
cannot be tried, adjudged to punishment, or punished for a 
public offense while he is insane." The· question of defend-
ant'. sanity at the time of the e,wnmission of the offense or 
at the time of his conviction or sentence is not involved in 
tIUa proceedin," The only question presented is whether a 
) 
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person who has been adjudged insane after conviction, sen-
tence, and delivery to a warden of a state prison for execu-
tion, has the right to a judicial determination of the question 
of his restoration to sanity. 
[1] The procedure for determining the question of the 
sanity of a prisoner under sentence of death is speci1ied in 
sections 3700 to 3704 of the Penal Code. Section 3700 pro-
vides that, "No judge, court, or officer, other than the Gov-
,ernor, can suspend the execution of a judgment of death, I 
except the warden of the State prison to whom he is delivered . 
for execution, as provided in the six succeeding sections, un-
less an appeal is taken." Four of the six sections referred 
to relate to the question of the prisoner's sanity. The other 
two, which prescribe the procedure for determining the ques-
"tion of the pregnancy of a woman sentenced to dea.th, are 
~ not material in this case. h CO Section 3701 provides for the determination of the ques-
~.' tion of defendant's sanity after he has been delivered to the 
~"state prison: "If after his delivery to the warden for execu-
!: tion, there is good reason to believe that a defendant, under 
~.. judgment of death, has become insane, the warden must call 
~, such fact to the attention of the district attorney of the county 
~' in which the prison is situated, whose duty it is to immedi-
; ately file in the superior court of such county a petition, ~.stating the conviction and judgment, and the fact that the 
(defendant is believed to be insane, and asking that the ques-
t.tion of his sanity be inquired into." Section 3702 provides I: 'the procedure for the hearing held pursuant to section 3701. I 
~' Section 3703 provides that "The verdict of the jury must be I' :eD;tered upon the minutes, and thereup~n. the court must make "and cause to be entered an order recltmg the fact of such 
'. 'inquiry and the result thereof, and when it is found that the 
", ldefendant is insane, the order must direct that he be taken f'~ ,a State hospital for the insane and there kept in a state 
~,-of confinement until his reason is restored." 
!~tSection 3704 provides for the disposition of the defendant ! 'after the court's order is entered: cc. • • if it is found that 
r the defendant is insane, the warden must suspend the execu-
ttion and transmit a certi1ied copy of the order mentioned in 
['the last section to the Governor, and deliver the defendant, 
ftogether with a certi1ied copy of such order, to the medical 
; "superintendent of the hospital named in such order. When 
¢~the ~efendant recovers his reason, the superintendent !",ust 
, '"rli/fl tMf fact to the Governor, who must thereupon lS8U8 
) 
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to the warden his warrant appointing a day for the execu-
tion of the judgment, and the warden shall thereupon return 
the defendant to the State prison pending the execution of 
the judgment." (Italics added.) 
It is apparent from a reading of sections 3700 to 3704 of 
the Penal Code that there is no provision for a judicial de-
termination of the question of the sanity of a defendant de-
livered to the warden of a state prison for execution except 
as set forth in section 3701. In fact, section 3700 expressly 
provides that after the defendant has had his appeal to this 
court, the execution of his sentence lies exclusively within the 
control of the Governor, and the warden of the prison. 
Petitioner contends, however, that the question of restora-
tion to sanity after a judicial determination that defendant 
is insane is necessarily a judicial question and that the statute 
must be interpreted as if it provided that, "w1l.en it ka8 been 
judicially determined t'kat defendant ka8 recovered 1I.is reason 
the superintendent must certify that fact to the Governor. 
• • ." Petitioner maintains that in view of the eases constru-
ing statutory provisions regarding the restoration to sanity 
of a defendant adjudged insane during the course of his trial 
(Pen. Code, §§ 1367-1372) defendant has a right to a judicial 
determination of the question of his restoration to sanity. 
Petitioner relies on the rule that a person confined in a state 
hospital pursuant to those provisions has a right to habeas 
corpus to determine whether his sanity has been restored. 
(Gardner v. Jones, 126 Cal. 614, 618 [59 P. 126]; In re Bu-
c'kanan, 129 Cal. 330, 331 [61 P. 1120, 50 L.R.A. 378]; see 
Peoplev. Superior Court, 4 Cal.2d 136, 145 [47 P'2d 724].) 
It is true that a defendant committed to such an institu-
tion has a right to his release therefrom, if it is determined 
on habeas corpus that he is improperly held because he is 
presently sane. If it is found that he is sane, he is returned 
to the custody of the sher:i1f and his trial proceeds. (In re 
Buc'kaMn, supra, at p. 336.) In the present ease, peti-
tioner does not seek release of defendant from the state hos-
pital, on the ground that he is sane, for if he were foun~ 
sane he would be delivered to the warden for execution. 
Instead, petitioner seeks the return of defendant to the state 
hospital, on the ground that he was improperly discharged 
therefrom. There is no authority, however, for the proposi-
tion that defendant has a right to habeas corpus or other 
judicial proceeding to determine the question of his sanity 
after his release from the state hospital. In fact, section 3700 
/ 
/ 
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of the Penal Code eXpressly prohibits such a proceeding. 
Once the superintendent certifies that defendant is sane, he 
is remanded to the custody of the warden for execution and 
"No judge, court or other officer other than the Governor" 
can then suspend the execution of the judgment, "except the 
warden of the State Prison to whom he is delivered. • . ." 
[t] Nor is there any provision for the superintendent to 
initiate judicial proceedings to ascertain the fact to which he 
certifies. The superintendent is not authorized, as the warden 
. is, to call the question to the attention of a district attorney 
for a judicial determination. Instead, it is his duty to cer-
tify the fact to the Governor "who must thereupon issue his 
warrant appointing a day for the exeeution .•.• " Sinee the 
method of determining the question of the sanity of a person 
awaiting execution is controlled by the Legislature and sinee 
'the Legislature has provided in Penal Code, section 3700, that 
the courts cannot suspend the execution of a judgment' of 
death and has provided in section 3701 for a judicial proceed-
ing to detennine the question of defendant's sanity only when . 
. the warden invokes such a proceeding, it is clear that the 
question of restoration to sanity under section 3704 is a ques-
tion for the determination of the superintendent. 
, [3] This interpretation of section 3704 is in accord with 
the interpretation by this court of the almost. identical lan-
guage of section 1372, which relates to the question of the 
restoration to sanity of a person who has been judicially ad-
judged insane before conviction. Section 1372, which was 
amended to its present form at the same time as the provisions 
with respect to the restoration to sanity of a person adjudged 
insane after conviction and sentence (Stats. 1905, pp. 699, 
704) ,. provides: "If the defendant is received into the state 
hospital he must be detained there until he becomes sane. 
When ke becomes sane tke 8'Upmntendent must certify tkat 
~GCt to the sherUf and district attorney of the' county. The 
.' -In 190G the provisiOJUl of 3704 were ecm.tained ill eection 1224, which 
... repealed and reeuaeted ill 1941 as section 3704 with the addition 
If the 1ast phrase that "the warden shall thereupon return the defend-
lilt to the state prison pending the execution of the judgment." Bee-
ion 10000 adopted at the lI8J11e time provides that, "The provisio118 of 
:tart 3 of this code (whieh includes sections 3700 to 3704J, in 80 far 
• they are sllbstantiall;y the same as existing provisio118 relating to 
he same subject matter, shall be construed as restatements and 'con-
inuati0118 thereof and not as new enactments." The addition of the 
sat ,hrase to section 3704 is clearly not material to this case or to 
be mterpretation of that aectiOIl with reepect to the duties of the 
.,..mteDd-. 
\ 
I 
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sheriff must thereupon • • . place him in proper custody 
until he is brought to trial or judgment as the case may be, or 
is legally discharged." (Italics added.) 
In construing section 1372 in People v. Superior Court, 4 
Ca1.2d 136, 144-147 [47 P.2d 7241, this court held that the 
question of defendant's restoration to sanit.y is for the super-
intendent to determine. The court stated that once a person 
has been committed to a state hospital under section 1372. 
" 'no court in this state is authorized to discharge him there-
from, or to restore him to the capacity of a sane person, 
under any circumstances, except upon a writ of habeas corpus. 
The power to discharge him otherwise than upon habeas 
corpus is vested exclusively in the officers of the asylum' •.. 
The Penal Code undoubtedly prescribes the exclusive manner 
by which the proceedings shall be set in motion when the 
defendant is restored to sanity or is not insane." (People v. 
Superior Court, supra, at 145.) After the superintendent 
determines that a defendant placed in his custody pursuant 
to sections 1370 to 1372 of the Penal Code is sane, the de-
fendant is returned to the court in which his trial had begun. 
It is not necessary for the verdict finding him insane to be 
vacated before the trial court may proceed. (People v. Rice, 
83 Cal.App. 55, 60 r256 P. 450].) 
When the provisions in question of both section 1372 and 
section 3704 were adopted in 1905, a· substantially similar 
provision of the Criminal Practice Act (Stats. 1851, p. 278, 
§ 591) relating to the restoration to sanity of a person ad-
judged insane before judgment had already been interpreted 
by this court. Section 589 of that act provided for the 
delivery of a person found to be insane before judgment to 
the custody of a "proper person" and for his redelivery by 
such person to the sheri1f upon his becoming sane. Section 
591 provided that, "If the defendant be received by the 
person so appointed he must be detained by him until he 
becomes insane. When he becomes sane, such person shall give 
. nofw. to the Sheri1f and District Attorney of the County of 
that fact!' (Italics added.) In People v. Parrell, 31 Cal. 576. 
580, it was held that this provision did not require a judicial 
determination of the question of restoration to sanity and 
that the verdict of insanity under which the defendant was 
committed did not have to be vacated before the defendant 
could be tried. Accordingly, it was not error for the trial 
) 
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court to proceed with the trial of the defendant without 
instituting "some form of judicial inquiry into the present 
sanity of the accused." (People v. Rice, 83 Cal.App. 55, 60, 
IUpra; People v. Superior Court, 4 Ca1.2d 136, 144-147, 
IUpra.) 
Since these statutes are obviously in pari materia, the in-
terpretation of a sentence in one controls the interpretation 
t of virtually the same sentence in the other. It must be assumed r also that when the Legislature adopted the present provisions 
W. of section 3704, it was aware of the construction that had 
I'i been given section 591 of the Criminal Practice Act. 
;,. [4] Petitioner contends, however, that section 3704 is ~, modified by section 6760 of the Welfare and Institutions 
(, Code, which provides: "A. patient committed to a State hos-
pital under the provisions of Chapter VI, Title X, Part II 
> of the Penal Code. ~hall, upon the certi1icate of the superin-
tendent that the person has recovered, approved by the 
superior judge of the county from which the patient was 
committed, be redelivered to the shel'i1t of such county, and 
. dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the above-
:" mentioned chapter of the Penal Code." Even if it be assumed 
that this section requires a judicial determination of the 
1 question of the restoration to sanity of one committed pur-
~ suant to the chapter of the code referred to (cf. People v. 
Superior Court, supra, 143-146), it clearly has no application 
to the present case, for petitioner was not committed under 
" the provisions of that chapter of the Penal Code, but under 
~.". the provisions of chapter 2, title 3, part 3 of that code with 
. respect to which there is no provision comparable to section 
. 6760 of the Welfare and Institutions Code requiring approval 
. of the superintendent's cretificate by the superior judge of 
the county from which the patient was committed. 
[15] Petitioner contends also that there is an inherent 
judicial power to determine the question of restoration to 
sanity, regardless of the statutes. He cites for this proposi-
tion the case of People v. Scott, 326 ID. 327, 338 [157 N.B. 
247] wherein it was held, in the absence of a statutory pro-
vision regarding restoration to sanity, that a jury trial of the 
.". question of sanity was proper. Where there is a statute 
'. that declares that the superintendent of the state hospital 
• where the prisoner is confined may declare the prisoner's 
. aanity restored, a person awaiting execution has no right to a 
I 
/ 
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judicial determination of his restoration to sanity. (Bar-
rett v. Commonwealth, 202 Ky. 153, 160 [259 S.W. 25].) By 
adopting section 3700 of the Penal Code prohibiting the 
courts from suspending the execution of a judgment of death 
except on appeal, the Legislature has provided in effect that 
the courts of this state are without power, except as provided 
by statute, to determine the sanity of a person who has been 
sentenced to be executed for a capital offense and is in the 
custody of the warden of a state prison for the purpose of 
execution. (See People v. Sloper, 198 Cal. 601, 608 [246 P. 
802].) Thus, regardless of what the common law powers of 
a court may be, when the procedure for the determination 
of the question of the sanity of a person who has been 
sentenced to death is covered by statute, a court has no in-
herent power to determine that question and such a person 
has no right to a judicial determination of the question unless 
the statutes so provide. (State v. Alexander, 87 Utah 376, 
381 [49 P.2d 408] ; Howell v. Kincannon, 181 Ark. 58 [24 
S.W.2d 953, 956]; Cribb v. Parker, 119 Ga. 298 [46 S.E. 110]; 
Baughn v. State, 100 Ga. 554 [28 S.E. 68, 70, 38 L.R.A. 577] ; 
NoNes v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398, 404 f18 S.Ct. 87, 42 L.Ed. 
515] ; see Baranoski's Case, 9 Pa. Co. Ct. 264, 266; cases col-
lected 49 A.L.R. 804; 38 L.R.A. 577, 588.) 
In California, moreover, this matter has never been gov-
erned by common law principles. Since the first Criminal 
Practice Act in this state (Stats. 1850, p. 312, § 505; § 473 
of the Criminal Practice Act of 1851, Stats. 1851, p. 264; 
§ 1224 of Pen. Code of 1872), the question of the sanity 
or restoration to sanity of such prisoners bas been governed i 
by statute. Until 1905, either the Governor or a judge of 
the trial court could determine whether or not a prisoner was 
sane and order his execution after he had been found insane 
by an inquisition. This provision was changed in 1905 by 
an amendment to section 1224 of the Penal Code whereby 
all ~ference to the court was omitted and the Governor was 
directed to issue a warrant for the execution of the prisoner 
on receipt of a certificate from the superintendent of the 
hospital. Section 3704 is a continuation of this provision. 
(Pen. Code, § 10000.) The courts of this state have therefore 
never had the right, independent of statute, to determine the 
question of the restoration to sanity of a defendant who is in 
the custody of a warden of a state prison for execution pur-
suant to & lawful judgment of death. . 
) 
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[6] The question remains whether the statutory procedure 
for determining the question of restoration to sanity is con-
stitutional. Petitioner contends that defendant has a right 
to an adjudication of the question of his sanity, protected 
by the due process clauses of the Constitution of the United 
States and the Constitution of California. There is no such 
right under either Constitution. The United States Supreme 
Court has held that the procedure for determining the ques-
tion of the sanity of a person who has been properly con-
victed of a capital offense and sentenced to death is a mat-
ter for the Legislature and courts of the jurisdiction in 
'.which the defendant is convicted and presents no federal 
question. (Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398, 404 [18 S.Ct. 87, 
·42 L.Ed. SIS].) On this ground the court aftirmed a decision 
. by the Supreme Court of Georgia (Btlug'll,(m v. State, 100 Ga. 
554 [28 S.E. 68, 70, 38 L.RA. 577]) that under the laws of 
Georgia a person convicted of a capital offense and sentenced I to death who thereafter becomes insane has no right to a 
: . judicial determination of the question of his sanity. (See, 
; ,also, eases collected in 49 A.L.R. 804.) We see no l'eaSOn why 
~ . the due process clause of the California Constitution should 
~ ,be interpreted differently. 
; The statutes of this state therefore provide the measure of 
i, defendant's rights to any determination .of the question 
; 'of his sanity. Defendant has thus far been afforded the 
; fnll protection of those statutes. Be was entitled to a judicial 
~ . determination of the question of his sanity after conviction 
to'and sentence only because the warden of the state prison at 
r I San Quentin believed that he was insane. The effect of the t.:~adjudication that he was insane was to prevent his execution 
r;1mtil the superintendent of the state hospital to which he 
L ~was sent certified that he had recovered his reason. His only 
, 
... ; right to another judicial determination of that question de-
, •. pends on the belief and action of the warden of the prison 
:'to whose custody he has been returned. (See People v. FM'-
~~reU, 31 Cal. 576, 581; People v. Rice, 83 Cal.App. 55, 61 [256 
;~~.P. 450].) 
I ~" This court has already decided that the authority given 
/ ~.rthe warden constitutes adequate protection to one who has 
t l been properly convicted of a capital offense. In People v. 
~:8loper, 198 Cal. 601, 607-608 [246 P. 802J, the defendant was 
~eomvieted of murder m the 11m clesno 8IId __ 10 
1'< J.':'" 
.• ~--
! 
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death. On appeal to this court, the judgment was affirmed. 
Defendant then sought to prevent the fixing of a date for 
execution and to obtain a trial on the question of his sanity. 
Upon the denial of this motion, defendant applied to this 
court for a stay of execution. In denying the application, 
this court, on the authority of Penal Code section 1221 (now 
§ 3700), held that no court in this state has the power to 
suspend the execution of a judgment of death to deter-
mine the question of the sanity of a person who became 
insane after his conviction and sentence. The court stated 
that "adequate statutory provision is made for the complete 
protection of the rights of a defendant who may have become 
insane after his conviction and sentence. • • • If it be found 
that defendant is insane [pursuant to these statutesJ, the 
court must direct that he be taken to one of the state hos-
pitals for the insane, and there kept in safe confinement until 
his reason is restored. When the defendant recovers his 
reason the superintendent of the hospital must certify that 
fact to the Governor, who must thereupon issue to the warden 
his warrant appointing a day for the execution of the 
judgment .••• We must conclude, therefore, that it was 
the intention of the legislature to limit the jurisdiction of 
the trial court, in proceedings of this nature to the making 
of the orders necessary to carry the judgment into ef-
fect. 'Ve are of opinion also, that, in view of the compre-
hensive and adequate provision made for the determination 
of the question of the sanity of a defendant who is alleged 
to have become insane after the rendition of a judgment 
of death, no substantial right of the defendant Sloper was 
affected by the action of the court below in denying his 
motion. . • • If it be a fact in this ease that the condemned 
man is insane, it must be assumed that the warden of the 
state prison will do his full duty to the end that the ques-
tion of the prisoner's sanity may be judicially determined." 
In the Sloper ease, there was no prior adjudication of 
insanity, but the opinion contains a clear expression of ap-
proval of the procedure thus far followed in the present case. 
[7] Petitioner contends, however, that because a court of 
law determined that the defendant was insane, only a court 
of law can determine that he is now sane. This contention 
is clearly inconsistent with section 3700 of the Penal Code 
and with the cases interpreting the provision of section 1372 
,) 
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of that code similar to the provision of section 3704. Sections 
37()()"3704 of the Penal Code provide for the adjudication, 
not of some continuing status, but only of the question 
whether the defendant is sane at the time of the hearing 
initiated by the warden. Moreover, the adjudication relied 
on by the petitioner did not purport to decide what the con-
dition of defendant's mind would be thereafter. There 
was no determination that defendant's insanity was incur-
able, even if it is assumed that such a determination would 
have been within the court's jurisdiction. The defendant 
was found insane at that time, and his execution was sus-
pended only until he recovered his reason. It was the order 
. of the court that the defendant be kept in confinement in the 
; state hospital until he recovered his reason and "when said 
. William Jerome Phyle recovers his reason, that the Superin-
;~ tendent of the State Hospital in which he is conftned certify 
, that fact to the Governor of the State of California for further 
: proceedings as is required by law." There is therefore no 
: .. merit to the contention that the adjudication that defendant 
, was insane at the time of this trial gave him a vested right 
to .the status of an insane person thereafter or until a court 
of law determined that he is sane . 
. ' [8] The petitioner contends also that the separation of 
i powers provision of section 1 of article In of the California 
',' .Constitution is violated by leaving the final determination of 
, a prisoner's sanity to administrative officers. The contention 
~ that the power to determine the question of restoration to 
!8anity of such a person cannot be given to the superintendent 
;)as already been answered adversely in this state in People 
~ 'v. Superior Court, 4 Ca1.2d 136, 146, supra, and Peopu v. 
'. 1ltu, 83 Cal.App. 55, 60, St'pra. In these cases it was held to 
~,be within the proper scope of the superintendent's powers to 
~.C1etermine the question of the restoration to sanity of defend-
~i.nta who had been adjudged insane before conviction. There-
~)dter the defendants were returned to the judge pursuant to 
/ ' iection 1372 of the Penal Code and their trial continued. The 
,,/ . Judge at that time could again have concluded pursuant to 
, section 1368 that it was doubtful whether the defendant was 
'Dne, and provided for a determination of the question in 
• proper judicial proceeding. (See People v. Ji'arrell, 31 Cal. 
576, 581, supra; People v. Rice, supra, at 61.) In this case 
that power and duty is given to the warden by section 3701 
L.,.,. r"' .. W; ~ 
,~~ .. ' ,:,.,'.< 
~ 
,,'. 
~: 
850 IN RE PHYLJ: [30 C.2d 
of the Penal Code, for the defendant is returned, not to a 
court but to the warden. 
[9] Even if the warden's power in this regard is judi-
cial, there is no violation of section 1 of article III of the 
California Constitution, for section 7 of article X specifically 
provides that "Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere 
ift, this Constitution, the Legislature may provide for the es-
tablishment, government, charge and superintendence of all 
institutions for all persons convicted of felonies. For this 
purpose, the Legislature may delegate the government, charge 
and superintendence of such institutions to any public gov-
ernmental agency or agencies, officers, or board or boards, 
whether now existing or hereafter created by it. Any of such 
agenciu, officers, or boards shall have such powers, perform 
IUCh dutiu and eurcise such functions in respect to other 
reformatory or penaZ matters, as the Legislature may pre-
scnDe." (Italics added.) 
The delegation of power contained in the former sections 
of the Penal Code on this subject (§§ 1221-1224) was 
validated by the same section of the Constitution in the fol-
lowing terms: "All existing statutes • • • purporting • . . 
to 80 delegate such government, charge and superintendence, 
to 80 prescribe such powers, duties or functions • . • are 
hereby ratified, validated and declared to be legally effective 
until the Legislature provides otherwise." By :noving these 
provisions from one part of the Penal Code to another, the 
Legislature did not change their effect. (Pen. Code, § 10000.) 
[10] Even if it is assumed that the power of the superin-
tendent of the state hospital, to whom defendant was deliv-
ered, to determine whether defendant has recovered his reason 
is a judicial power, the foregoing provisions of the Cali-
fornia Constitution authorize the delegation of this power. 
Under the statutes the ~risoner is delivered to the custody 
of the superintendent as a person convicted of a felony, and 
thereafter, 80 far as the superintendent's authority over such 
a person is concerned the superintendent exercises not only 
I the authority of an officer entrusted with the superintendence 
/ of an institution for convicted felons but the duties and func-
tions prescribed in Penal Code, section 3704. 
It follows that unless the warden of the prison in which 
defendant is incarcerated believes that defendant is now 
insane, no court of this state has jurisdiction to determine 
the question of his sanity. It has been suggested that this 
conclusion must be wrong on the ground that if the mat-
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ter is left to the discretion of the warden, a circular proces..'i 
may begin whereby defendant will again be found insane, 
again sent to a state hospital, and again declared restored to 
sanity. It has therefore been suggested that only a judicial 
determination of this question at this time will prevent such 
circuity. This suggestion is based on the assumptions that 
the warden believes that defendant is insane, that a jury would 
find him to be insane, and that the superintendent of the 
Mendocino State Hospital was in error - assumptions that 
this court cannot properly make. Moreover, it does not fol-
low that a judicial determination of this question will prevent 
circuity. If this court were to hold that defendant has a right 
to a judicial determination of the question of his restoration 
to sanity under some procedure not specified in Penal Code, 
sections 3700 to 3704, such a determination would be either 
that defendant is sane or insane. If the verdict is that he 
is insane, the defendant would have to be delivered to an 
institntion and detained there until in a judicial proceeding 
he was found sane. If the verdict is that he is sane, the de-
fendant would be delivered to the warden for execution, and 
the date for execution would have to be set again. During 
the interval between this adjudication and the date for exe· 
cution, the defendant may again become insane. Unless the 
warden is to execute an insane person in violation of Penal 
Code, section 1367, it would be the warden's duty, if he had 
good reason to believe that defendant was insane, to set in 
motion again the procedure for determining the defendant's 
sanity. The duty of preventing execution of an insane per-
son is given by statute to the warden and to the Governor, 
and even if it were held that defendant has a right to a judi-
cial determination of the question of his sanity, the determi-
nation that he is sane at the time finally set for his execution 
must be made by the warden. 
The writ is discharged, and William Jerome Phyle is re-
manded to custody. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., eon-
/ eurred.. 
SCHAUER, J.-I dissesnt. 
I cannot agree that the privnege of the writ of habeas COl'-
pus may be denied to a person solely because he has been 
convicted of crime, sentenced to death, adjudged insane, and 
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committed to a state hospital; nor can I agree that the powers 
vested in the warden of a state prison or in the medical super-
intendent of a state hospital for the insane transcend and ab-
rogate the powers of the courts to entertain proceedings on 
habeas corpus. It is indisputable, I think, that the powers of 
the courts on habeas corpus proceedings are substantially ab-
rogated in cases of this type by the holding of the majority 
opinion that the factual determination of an administrative 
agent is absolutely conclusive on the courts in such proceed-
ings. 
The real issue here is not what is stated in the majority 
opinion. It really is more simple and much more grave. On 
behalf of the prisoner it is alleged in material part "That 
on the 24th day of December, 1946, after a jury trial in the 
Superior Court ... William Jerome Phyle [the prisoner] 
was adjudged insane, and said Superior Court committed 
said ... Phyle to the State Hospital at Talmadge, to be held 
there as an insane person, and there kept in a state of con-
finement until his reason be restored. [Italics added.] 
"That thereafter, said Wililam .Terome Phyle remained in 
the Mendocino State Hospital at Talmadge, California, until 
January 18, 1947, at which time the Superintendent of the 
Mendocino State Hospital presented to the Governor his cer-
tificate that the said William Jerome Phyle had recovered his 
reason, whereas said Phyle was, and still is, insane. [Italics 
added.] 
"That thereafter, the Governor of the State of California 
isued to the Warden [of the state prison] the Governor'. 
warrant, appointing the 2nd day of May, 1947 for the execu- ! 
tion by means of lethal gas of William Jerome Phyle .•.• 
"That unless this Court restrains Clinton T. Du1fy [the 
warden of the state prison] from carrying out the warrant of 
the Governor,. that said . • • Phyle will be executed on Fri-
day, the 2nd day of May, 1947." 
According to the return to the writ, the prisoner had been 
sentenced to death; thereafter upon proper legal proceed": 
ings under chapter 2, article 3, part 3 of the Penal Code, a 
jury found he was insane and the superior court on December 
24, 1946, ordered that he be confined in a state hospital "until 
his reason be restored"; the superintendent of such hospital 
on January 18. 1947, !'ertified to the governor that he was 
aane; the governor made his warrant of execution; and the 
• i 
) 
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warden holds the prisoner pursuant to such sentence and 
warrant. 
The controlling facts shown by the petition and return. are 
that the prisoner was duly adjudged insane and committed 
by judgment of the superior court to be confined in a state 
hospital "until his reason be restored"; that his reason laas 
not in fact been restored (that he "was, and still is, insane") 
but that, notwithstanding the judgment and his continuing 
insanity he has been released from the state hospital and the 
custody of its superintendent and transferred to the state 
prison and custody of the warden and will be executed while 
insane unless this court intervenes. It is most important to 
Dote that the vital allegation that the prisoner "was, and still 
is, insane," is not challenged in the return and must be 
deemed admitted. The majority opinion necessarily holds 
that this fact, or at least the allegation of it, is wholly imma-
terial because the superintendent of the hospital has pre-
sumptively determined and has certified that the prisoner 
has recovered his reason; such determination and certification, 
the majority hold, are conclusive on the prisoner and on this 
court; hence habeas corpus will be denied. Obviously, the 
determination of the majority does not rest upon any inquiry 
or determination by the ccmrl as to the fact of sanity or in-
sanity of the prisoner; it rests squarely on the hOlding that 
the administrative agent has sole and uncontrolled authority 
to determine and certify the fact of sanity or insanity and 
that such fact, when so certified, cannot be disputed by the 
, prisoner or inquired into by the eourt. This, clearly, is ab-
rogation of the rights and powers of habeas corpus in such 
.'case. 
{., Contrary to the implications of the majority opinion (the 
'.order reads, "The writ is discharged, and William Phyle ill! 
~,remanded to custody" [italics added]), the petition does not 
i: seek release of the prisoner; as appears on its face and as 
:.m hereinafter shown in detail, it seeks only to have him trans-
; :Cerred in custody from an unlawful to a lawful custodian; 
I i.e., from the custody of the warden of the prison to the 
/ custody of the superintendent of the state hospital. .As is also 
, . more particularly shown hereinafter, upon the unchallenged 
, 'facts alleged. the supel'intt'ndent of the hospital is the sole 
, lawful custodian of the prisoner. { ", 
~> ~, 
) 
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The relief sought may be granted on petition for habeas 
corpus. Section 1493 of the Penal Code provides that "In 
cases where any party is held under 'illegal restraint or CU.~­
tody, or any other person is entitled to the restraint or custody 
of such party, the judge or court may order such party to be 
committed to the restraint or custody of such person as is 
by law entitled thereto." (Italics added.) Section 1487 of 
the same code provides that "If it appears on the return 
of the writ that the prisoner is in eu..'!tody by virtue of 
process from any court of this state, or judge or of6eer 
thereof, such prisoner may be discharged or remanded 
te proper custody as provided by section 1486] ••. 5. 
When the person having the custody of the prisoner is 
not the person allowed by law to detain him." As previ-
ously set forth, the petition alleges facts which indubi-
tably entitle the prisoner to the relief sought if the facts 
be true. Such facts are that the prisoner has been convicted 
of crime and sentenced to death; that after such conviction 
he was duly adjudged insane and committed to the state hos-
pital "to be there confined until his reason be reStored"; that 
he "was, and still is, insane"; that notwithstanding the actual 
eontinuance of his insanity the superintendent of the hospital 
has certified that he is sane and he has been transferred from 
the custody of the hospital superintendent to the custody of 
the prison warden and that he will be executed by the prison 
warden unless this court restrains such action. 
From what has been above related it appears that the basic 
issue here is, is the asserted determination of the medical su-
perintendent that the prisoner is now sane conclusive on the 
court and on the prisoner in a habeas corpus proceeding 
wherein it is alleged that the prisoner is in fact insane' In 
other words, does certification of sanity by the state hospital 
superintendent preclude the prisoner from alleging and prov-
ing and the court from detennining that, contrary to the cer-
tification, the prisoner is in truth insane! If the answer to 
these questions is yes, as the majority hold, then the right of 
habeas corpus is effectively abrogated as to persons in the 
status of the prisoner before us. 
The holding of the majority opinion that the medical super-
intendent has exclusive and transcendant powers to detennine 
questions of sanity of prisoners is squarely contrary to earlier 
holdings of this court. In Gardner v. Jonel (1899), 126 Cal. 
) 
/ 
) 
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614 [59 P. 126], we find a case which in material legal prin-
ciples is identical to that now before us. Dr. A. 'M. Gardner 
was then (1899) superintendent of the Napa State Hospital. 
He applied to this court "for a writ to prohibit defendant 
[judge of the superior court of Contra Costa county, and the 
superior court of Napa County] from entertaining juris-
diction in a certain habeas corpus case" whereby the Napa 
Comity Superior Court was assuming to determine the ques-
tion of the restoration to sanity of one Bucllanan, who had 
been committed to the state hospital as insane. This court 
said (pages 615-616 of 126 Cal.), "The question is an im-
portant one, inasmuch 88 it involves the right of an inmate 
of a state hospital, who happens at the time to be resting 
under a criminal charge and is committed pending trial for 
his crime. to have his alleged insanity made the subject of 
judicial inquiry by the writ of habeas corpus. It is claimed 
'(exactly as here] that 'the medical superintendent u the only 
·perlon (Jf' tnOunaZ vested by 'law with authority to d8termine 
w7&et7&er (Jf' not an insane patienf of thu elMI 7t& rec01J-
·tJf'6d.' ••• 
"The provisions of the Penal Code regulating the commit-
ment of persons charged with crime are found in sections 
1367 to 1373. No quesHon arises as to the regularity of Bucha-
nan's commitment under these provisions. Section 1372 pro-
rides as follows 'If the defendant is received into the asylum, 
he must be detained there until he becomes sane. When he 
becomes sane, the superintendent must give notice of that fact 
to the sheri1f and district attorney of the county. The sheri1f 
must thereupon, without delay, bring the defendant from the 
:asylum and place him in proper custody until he is brought 
to trial or judgment, as the case may be. or is legally dis-
charged.' 
: "Section 1473 of the Penal Code provides 88 follows: 
'Every person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his h'b-
arty, under any pretense whatever, may prosecute a writ of 
labeas corpus to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment 
.or restraint.' 
/ . "Section 5, article I, of the constitution reads: 'The 
. privilege of the writ of habeas COrp'UI shall not be suspended 
unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public 
Safety may require its suspension.' 
/ 
856 IN UPHYLB [30C.2d 
"We find in the statute no authority for making two classes 
of insane--one civil and the other criminal-and by any such 
classification to take the latter out of the operation of the 
statute as to the right of habeas corpus. Section 13, article 
III, of the insanity law makes no such distinction. But 
plaint itT contends that section 14 of article III in terms con-
fers authority upon the medical superintendent to determine 
when the patient of the criminal class is restored to sanity, 
and, as the authority is not conferred upon any other per-
son or tribunal, it is necessarily exclusive, and also proves 
that the law recognizes the two mentioned classes of insane. 
We cannot believe that the legislature intended to enact a 
law so entirely out of harmony with the spirit and letter of 
the constitution and the statute to which attention has been 
called. It is our duty to harmonize sections 13 and 14, article 
III, of the insanity law, so as to conform to the constitution 
and to the statutes quoted, if we can, rather than resort to 
the more extreme necessity of holding section 14 to be un-
constitutional, as defendant claims it to be, if given the 
construction placed upon it by plaintiff. We think it was 
intended by section 14 to provide means by which a patient 
of Buchanan's class, whose reason has become restored, could 
be at once remanded to the sheriff of the proper county for 
trial; but it was not intended that the arbitrary power 
should rest with the medical superintendent to deprive the 
patient of the right to be so returned, nor was " intended 
tkat tke medical superintendent skould be tke ea:clusi1Je judge 
of tke patienfs restoration. [Italics added.] •.. 
"[Po 618.] The question of Buchanan's recovery, in our 
opinion, is jurisdictional and may be examined upon habeas 
corpus • ••• 
"[Po 619.] Section 1493 [Pen. Code] provides: 'In cases 
where any party is held under illegal restraint or custody, or 
any other person is entitled to the restraint or custody of 
such party, the judge or court may order such party to be 
committed to the restraint or custody of such person as is 
by law entitled thereto.' In his petition Buchanan does not 
ask to be restored to his freedom; he asks to be rede1ivered 
to the sheriff of Yuba county ..•• We see no reason why 
the court or judge should not have the power by an order 
to direct that Buchanan be redelivered to the sheriff as 
prayed for •••• " 
) 
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In accord with the reasoning above quoted the application 
of the medical superintendent for the writ of prohibition 
was denied and thereafter in the habeas corpus proceeding 
the superior court proceeded to determine the issue as to 
the defendant's restoration to sanity. It determined that the 
defendant-petitioner was still insane and remanded him to 
tke custody of Dr. Gardner. Thereupon application for 
habeas corpus was made to this court. Chief Justice Beatty, 
authoring the opinion of the court, again referred to Dr. 
Gardner's claim of exclusive jurisdiction, as asserted in his 
~ application for, prohibition, and declared (In re Buchanaft 
f,(1900), 129 Cal. 330, 332-333 [61 P. 1120, 50 A.L.R. 378]), 
r "It was there [in Gardner v. Jones (1899), supra, 126 Cal. 
\,' 614] contended that the insanity law of 1897 Stats. 1897, p. t 311) has made the superintendent of the asylum the sole and 
I" :ftnal judge, in a case of this kind, whether the prisoner has 
~~ become sane, and that the courts no longer have the power ~ to conduct the inquiry by habeas corpus, or otherwise. It 
~ Was held against this contention that the question of unlawful 
r; ,,.estraint of the liberty of (J citizen ii, and must be as long as 
~; our present constitution endures, (J iudici4l question to be 
, determined by the courts, (Jnd tkat tke statute ,.eferred to 
, tDould be unconstitutional if it required the constf'UCtion COft-
'. teftded for. [Italics added.] ••• In consequence of this 
decision the superior judge proceeded with the hearing upon 
" return to the writ of habeas corpus issued by him, and having 
r 'concluded upon the evidence that Buchanan was still insane, t, made an order remanding him to the custody of Dr. Gardner. l, Thereupon the present proceeding was commenced in this 
~ court, and upon the same evidence submitted to the superior 
r, 'judge, and some additional testimony, we must MtD decide ~. tke quesfioft of fact whether Buchanan kaa become MM. 
~;[ItaliCS added.1 ,;,:, "The question, however, is not whether he has become sane 
i In every sense of the word, but whether he has become sane 
~'m the sense of the statute, which requires a suspension of 
}: the proceedings in a criminal cause whenever it is found 
, that the defendant is presently insane. In other words, if 
/\ there is a difference between the medical view of insanity 
,,': and the view upon which the statute is founded, the question t of sanit¥. or insanity ja ~ be determined with reference to 
~. t, ' 
i ~, 
l: !-.' 
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the latter as contra-distinguished from the former view. 
That there is such a difference is notorious .•.. " In the light 
of that diiference the writ was sustained and Buchanan was 
ordered "returned to the custody of the sheriif of Yuba 
county." (Here we have no way of knowing what standard 
of sanity or insanity the present superintendent of the state 
hospital applied in certifying that the prisoner is sane.) 
Several vices in the majority opinion become apparent from 
what has been quoted from Gordner v. Jonu (1899), ""pro, 
126 Cal. 614, and from 1# re BUCMM# (1900), ""prtJ, 129 
Cal. 330. In the t1rst place, the majority opinion unconstitu-
tionally denies the protection of habeas corpus, at least as 
exemplliied by a court trial of the issue of fact (if there be one 
under the pleadings in view of the failure to deny that the 
prisoner is presently insane) to this petitioner. Our state 
Constitution (art. I, § 5) declares that "The privilege of the 
writ of habeas corpus sliall not be suspended unless when, 
in eases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may re-
quire its suspension." Section 9(2) of article I of the United 
States Constitution makes the same provision. There is in 
this case no suggestion that there is e:xtant any status of 
rebellion or invasion whereby to justify suspension of the 
writ in the public safety. But the majority opinion, in all 
practical effect, suspends it-even abrogates it altogether-
in so far as concerns persons who have been convicted of 
crime, sentenced to death, and thereafter adjudged insane. 
If the prisoner's insanity in fact continues, as is specifica.lly 
alleged and not denied, the law and the judgment of the 
superior court require that he be continued in the state hos-
pital until his sanity is restored. As shown hereinabove, 
habeas corpus is a proper remedy. If we refuse him the 
relief sought, solely on the ground that the medical superin-
tendent's certificate of restoration is conclusive of the fact 
of sanity, we are necessarily abrogating our power in the 
premises-our power to determine the :fact of insanity. And, 
furthermore, we are abrogating the right of the prisoner to 
I even challenge, on habeas corpus, one of the facts upon which 
/ the legality of his custody and impending execution depends. 
/ That is certainly an abrogation of the right of habeas corpus. 
No authority is cited for holding that a person in the status 
of this prisoner may be deprived of the rights of habeas 
corpus. 
) 
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It is important also to note that section 1367 of the Penal 
Code provides that "A person cannot be tried, adjudged to 
punishment, or punished for a public o1fense, while he is 
insane." If this section means anything at all it should mean 
that it establishes a right which a convicted person, sane or 
insane, or one who speaks for him, may enforce in the courts. 
If the courts cannot enforce it, it is a poor right. If the 
right of habeas corpus is to be denied to such a person it 
should be by clear constitutional provision, not by court 
legislation. 
It should be observed also that the State may eventually 
find that the majority holding here is unfortunate. If the 
statutes in question, as held by the majority, vest absolute, 
conclusive, and exclusive power in the superintendent of the 
state hospital "for the determination of the question of the 
sanity of a person who has been sentenced to death," and 
if it be true, as is also held by the majority, that "a court 
has no inherent power to determine that question," then, of 
course, the determination of the superintendent is equally 
final regardless of whether he determine that the prisoner 
. is sane or insane. In some future case such a superintendent 
may rule that a prisoner remains insane although other state 
officers have reason to believe that such prisoner has recovered 
, his sanity. Under the majority holding, the fact of recovered 
sanity would be wholly immaterial; an allegation to that 
e1feet, although not denied, would be totally disregarded. 
INeither the prisoner himself nor. the prosecuting officers of 
l'the state would be heard to contend that in truth the prisoner 
had recovered his reason. Only the certificate of the super-
intendent, based on any standard of sanity (medical or legal) 
which he might elect to use, could determine that fact; his 
, discretion in any event would be wholly uncontrolled and 
~ if he refused to give the certUicate the courts of this state' l would be powerless to intervene. f . The majority opinion devotes much space to a discussion 
f' of the duties and powers of the hospital superintendent and 
:,10 those of the prison warden and suggests that the warden, 
~ if 80 disposed, can again initiate proceedings for another jury 
~trial on the issue of the prisoner's present sanity status. But 
, such speculation is scarcely germane to the issue before us. 
,.The duties of the warden are one thi.nsi our duties on habeas 
;Ji 
!it. 
" 
,
It'.' 
.:J 
.~ 
," 
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corpus are quite another. The petition alleges that "unless 
this Court restrains Clinton T. Du£ry [the prison warden] 
from carrying out the warrant of the Governor, that said ..• 
[prisoner] will be executed on Friday, the 2nd day of May, 
1947." The fact that the writ prayed for originally issued 
and that in consequence the date of e.xecuti~n has been post-
poned until this cause is finally decided, does not mean 
that the jeopardy of the prisoner is lessened. The allegation, 
coupled with the other averments above quoted,· still unmis-
takably means that the prisoner, although presently insane, 
will be executed under the warrant which has been issued 
unless we rule otherwise. Whether that allegation be true, 
the majority hold, we will not inquire because we have no 
power in any event to prevent the execution. I cannot sub-
scribe to such a doctrine. 
Failure to espouse such doctrine does not mean that any 
statute in question is made meaningless. The provisions 
of Penal Code section 3704 that "When the defendant re-
covers his reason the superintendent of such [state] hospital ' 
must certify that fact to the Governor" and that the de-
fendant may then be returned to prison and executed, like 
the provisions of section 1372, hereinabove cited and dis-
cussed in the quotation from the Ga$er case, may be 
given e1fect and applied in all proper cases. Under the 
language of that section (§ 3704) it may well be that a 
superintendent of a state hospital has implied authority to 
make a prima facie determination that a prisoner has re-
covered (or not recovered) his sanity and to certify him 
back to the warden of the state prison for execution. But 
this does not mean that the prisoner must be denied habeas 
corpus, or an examination and determination by 1M court 
upon habeas corpus, of the fact, if it be alleged, that the 
prisoner is in fact insane (or sane) although the superin. 
tendent may have determined and certified that he is sane 
(or insane). 
The history of habeas corpus, the great care with which 
I the rights of all persons to invoke that remedy have been J guarded by provisions of our national and state constitutions 
! and the jealous solicitude with which the courts have here-
tofore protected those rights, all combine to forbid the hold· 
ing which the prosecuting officers of this State now espouse 
and which the majority make. 
! 
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The State, if it requests such relief, should be given oppor-
tunity to challenge the now admitted averment that the 
prisoner "still is" insane; that issue should then be tried out 
before a referee; and our order should depend on our de-
termination of the fact, not on subservience to an asserted 
"conclusive" determination of an administrative agent. Thus 
may the right of habeas corpus be preserved, the court 
maintain its jurisdiction, and justice still run its full course. 
Carter, J., concurred. 
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied De-
eember .8, 1947. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., voted for a 
rehearing. 
